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European Union Consumer Law through 
reading a short novel: partisanship and social 
justice in “D’autres vies que la mienne” by 
Emmanuel Carrère  
Giorgio Leali 
Abstract: 
 [European Union Consumer Law Through Reading a Short Novel: Partisanhip and Social Justice in 
“D’autres vies que la mienne” by Emmanuel Carrère] The paper adopts the perspective of “law 
and literature” studies to investigate how the French novel ‘Lives others than my own 
(D’autres vies que la mienne)’ by Emmanuel Carrère addresses the evolutions of European 
Union law on unfair terms in consumer contracts. By looking at European Union law 
from the perspective of individual lives, the essay compares the way in which literature 
and EU law conceive three categories of individuals involved: consumers, moneylenders 
and judges. Carrère’s novel is taken as an example to challenge the stereotype according 
to which literature expresses a sympathetic and partisan conception of social reality 
compared to the one of law.  
Key words: European Union law, consumer law, philosophy of law, partisanship, Jus-
tice, unfair contract terms, law in literature 
I. Introduction: literature and the perspective of individual lives 
La justice, la paix, la mesure, l’honneur, la raison, le dépassement de la raison, le 
sacré, la liberté, l’égalité, la fraternité, le respect de l’homme: c’est notre civilisation, 
la base de notre droit et de notre société [...]. Ils n’appartiennent ni au droit ni à la 
littérature, mais aux uns et aux autres, parce qu’il y a une unité profonde dans la 
pensée humaine. Ils ne le disent sans doute pas de la même manière: le droit avec 
précision et sécheresse, en en faisant une logique de l’action; la littérature avec 
                                                 
 European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science & École d’affaires publiques, 
Institut d’études politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) g.leali@lse.ac.uk  
I want to warmly thank professor Loïc Azoulai for suggesting me to look at European Union law from 
the perspective of individual lives and to read Carrère’s novel under this approach. 
All the following quotes will be taken from the original French version of the novel: E. Carrère, D’autres 
vies que la mienne, Paris, P.O.L., 2009. 
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élégance, profondeur et séduction, mais souvent avec imprécision. Nous avons 
besoin les uns des autres, nous ne devons pas, nous ne pouvons pas nous passer 
les uns des autres.1 
We are used to think that each segment of reality is better analysed and understood by 
using the language and the method that usually deal with it. Nevertheless, in many cases, 
different disciplines share the same objects of study and look at them from different 
perspectives.2 The intersection of point of views on a same object is the theoretical 
precondition to all interdisciplinary study dealing with social phenomena: this is 
particularly true with regard to the deep relationship between law and literature of which 
the novel by Emmanuel Carrère is only one of the countless examples. Such a 
relationship proves to be particularly precious when looking at law from the perspective 
of individuals such as consumers for two reasons. 
The first one has to do with the fact that ‘law and literature structure reality 
through language’.3 In other words, they share the power to create reality and social cat-
egories only by naming them. As Pierre Bourdieu wrote, on one hand ‘law is the quin-
tessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates the thing named and cre-
ates social groups in particular’4 and, on the other hand, art and literature have ‘the 
properly symbolic power of […] revealing in an explicit, objectified way the more or less 
confused, vague, unformulated even unformulable experiences of the natural world and 
the social world, and bringing them into existence’.5 In some cases, law and literature 
contribute to shape the same social categories but they portrait them in different ways: 
this essay will measure the distance between the representations of individuals such as 
consumers, moneylenders and judges in European Union law and the way in which the 
same categories are portrayed by Emmanuel Carrère’s novel. 
Another common feature shows that the ‘law and literature’ perspective offers the 
best tools to understand the role of individuals in EU law: law and literature often share 
the same function of conveying values and approving or disapproving behaviours. As 
Philippe Malaurie pointed out, law and literature are often expressing the same funda-
mental values in different but complementary styles.6 
                                                 
1 P. Malaurie, Droit et littérature. Une Anthologie, Paris, Éditions Cujas, 1997, p. 13. 
2 In order to make this very general statement clearer and less obvious, let’s take a somewhat caricatured 
example. When looking at a sailing boat in the middle of the sea, a physicist will be interested in the Ar-
chimede’s principle as a result of which the boat floats while a meteorologist will study the intensity and 
the direction of the wind pushing it. A sociologist will reflect on the relational dynamics between the 
members of the crew and on the social status and of the sailing boat owner. At the same time a lawyer 
will look at the flag in the stern in order to determine which national law will be applicable in case of dis-
putes. The perspective of the novelist and, more generally, of the artist, is more likely to focus on the nar-
rative and aesthetic dimension of reality: the destination of the boat trip, a potential mutiny or love story 
among the members of the crew, the beauty of a sunset on the sea. 
3 K. Dolin, A critical introduction to Law and Literature, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 11. 
4 Ivi, p. 12. Dolin quotes P. Bourdieu, ‘The force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field’, Hast-
ing Law Review 38 (1987), p. 838.  
5 Ibid. Dolin quotes P. Bourdieu, ‘The intellectual field: A World Apart’, in Other Words: Essays on a Reflexive 
Sociology (Trans. Matthew Adamson), Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 146. 
6 On one hand, law has the difficult task of defining the legal meaning of philosophical values such as jus-
tice, freedom or human dignity in a way that needs to be precise and flexible at the same time in order to 
avoid legal uncertainty and allow evolutions in the interpretation of norms. On the other hand, literature, 
instead of providing a stable definition of such values, put them on the stage and often reveals their ambi-
guity and possible contradictions. 
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A third preliminary remark needs to be done. ‘Law and literature’ studies are tradi-
tionally structured in two main fields: ‘law in literature’ and ‘law as literature’. In very 
general terms, the ‘law in literature’ approach explores the way in which legal issues and 
legal experience are exposed by literature while ‘law as literature’ scholars focus on legal 
language and on its literary dimension.7 The novel by Emmanuel Carrère is about the 
true story of two French judges: therefore, the exercise of looking at European Union 
consumer law through D’autres vies que la mienne falls under the ‘law in literature’ research 
field. Taking the perspective of literature will be the occasion to push back the idea that 
lawyers hold a monopoly on the representation of the legal world and to seek the fun-
damental target of ‘law and literature’ scholars: 
[…] rendre le droit et la justice à la vie et donc les retirer à la seule garde des 
juristes, qui aimeraient tant en être les usufruitiers.8 
Nevertheless, this essay will argue that, in the particular case of Carrère’s novel, the per-
spective of literature coincides with the one of law. This will be stressed by showing that 
the frequently alleged partisanship and subjectivity of novels such as Carrère’s one ap-
pear to be in conflict with some norms, namely the ones of traditional contract law, but 
not with the totality of the legal order, that also includes “higher” norms such as the 
European ones. In other words, in this particular case, the conflict between the values 
conveyed by literature and the ones protected by law is nothing but an optical illusion 
that can be solved by applying a legal principle, namely hierarchy of norms. D’autres vies 
que la mienne” can therefore be interpreted as an evidence of the fact that concerns 
shared by literature and often perceived as opposed to the ones governed by law, are in 
reality integrated in the legal order and protected by higher norms, in this case European 
Union consumer law. 
II. EU Consumer Law in Literature: the extent of judge’s power in 
protecting consumers according to CJEU case law 
D’autres vies que la mienne is the first-hand account of two dramatic stories of which Em-
manuel Carrère has been witness over the course of a few months: the first one is the 
tragedy of 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the second is the death of Juliette, the sis-
ter of Carrère’s partner. Juliette used to be a judge at the tribunal d’instance of Vienne, a 
small town in the Isère department in France. After her death, the author meets her col-
league and friend Étienne Rigal, who tells him the story of his life and retraces the eve-
ryday work of two provincial judges dealing with over-indebtedness procedures. Both 
Juliette and Étienne have been cancer patients and became crippled: together they ruled 
against the French Cour de cassation case law on a decisive procedural issue in consumer 
law and gave to the Court of Justice of the European Union the occasion to overrule it. 
                                                 
7 «Tout autre est l’approche qui considère le droit comme littérature, en analysant la dimension littéraire 
du texte juridique, point de vue dominant aux Etats-Unis où la common law s’énonce comme un im-
mense récit jurisprudentiel perpétuellement repris, réinterprété et inventé. Il est possible enfin de chercher 
le droit dans la littérature, en se concentrant sur la façon dont la fiction littéraire réfléchit le monde de la 
justice et du droit.» A. Garapon, D. Salas (eds.), Imaginer la loi. Le droit dans la littérature, Paris, Michalon, 
2006, p. 8.  
8 Ivi, p. 15. 
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The dialogue between national judges and the European Court of Justice con-
cerned the procedural issue of judges’ power to assess unfairness of consumer credit 
contracts. A Council Directive of 5 April 1993 gives a definition of ‘unfair terms’ in 
consumer contracts and provides a non-exhaustive list of examples.9 According to Arti-
cle 3(1) of the Directive ‘a contractual term which has not been individually negotiated 
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a sig-
nificant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer’. Under Article 6(1) such an unfair contract terms will not 
have any binding effect on the consumer. 
Nevertheless, the effectivity of the Directive in preventing and sanctioning unfair 
terms in consumer contracts risked to be considerably challenged by procedural provi-
sions identifying the actors entitled to invoke such unfairness and limiting the timeframe 
during which it can be contested. In fact, before 2008, two French law provisions were 
likely to negatively affect the enforcement of the Directive.10 The first one concerned 
the power of judge to asses on his own motion the unfairness of contract terms. In this 
respect, the case law of the Cour de cassation established that the power to invoke national 
consumer law against unfair contract terms only belonged to consumers. Consequently, 
the judge had no power to assess unfairness if he was not asked to do it.11 The second 
limitation was stated by Article L.311-37 of French consumer code, according to which 
actions brought before the Tribunal d’instance, the competent judge for consumer con-
tract issues, ‘must be raised within two years of the event which gave rise to them and 
are otherwise time-barred’. 
The combination of these two provisions contributed to considerably diminish 
the chances of succeeding of consumers who had been victims of unfair contract provi-
sions. With regard to the limited power of judge, it has to be observed that consumers 
often do not have the competences and the legal assistance that are necessary to detect 
unfair terms on their own. Consequently, if the judge is not allowed to assess them on 
his own motion, the consumer will continue to fulfil obligations raising from the unfair 
contract terms. Regarding time-barring, such a rule allowed traders to wait for the expi-
ration of the limitation period and then ask for payment on the basis of unfair contract 
terms. The negative consequence for consumers was evident: as ‘unfair contract clauses 
usually only gain practical relevance once the trader takes action against the consumer. 
With a limitation period as the one described, the trader only needs to wait for the two 
years to be expired in order to be able to enforce an otherwise invalid unfair contract 
term, thereby depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by Directive 
93/13/EEC.’12 
The efforts made by Étienne and Juliette to protect consumers and fight against 
unfair contract terms were often doomed to failure because of these two procedural lim-
itation until the day in which Étienne, while reading a legal journal in his office, found 
out that the Court of Justice of European Union ruled against the first of them. In fact, 
                                                 
9 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts {1993} OJ 
L95/29. 
10 As it will be shown later, in 2008, a new article L. 141-4 in the French consumer code adapted French 
law to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
11 See for instance Cour de cassation, 1ère chamber civile, 15 février 2000, pourvoi n° 98-12.713 PB according to 
which: «[…] la méconnaissance des exigences des textes susvisés, même d’ordre public, ne peut être op-
posée qu’à la demande de la personne que ces dispositions ont pour objet de protéger». 
12 P. Rott, ‘Unfair contract terms’, in C. Twigg-Flesner (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Consumer and Con-
tract Law, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, pp. 307-308. 
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according to the Océano Grupo decision, ‘national courts do not only have the right but 
also the duty to assess the unfairness of not individually negotiated contract terms’.13 
This is because such a power constitutes ‘a proper means […] of […] preventing and 
individual consumer from being bound by an unfair terms’ and ‘may act as a deterrent 
and contribute to preventing unfair terms in contracts concluded between consumers 
and sellers or suppliers’.14 This decision showed the incompatibility of Spanish and 
French laws with the Directive and encouraged Étienne and Juliette to challenge the 
second procedural limitation: the two-year time limitation set up by the French Con-
sumer code. 
The two provincial judges of Vienne decided to continue the dialogue with the 
European Court and to catch the first opportunity to refer a question for a preliminary 
ruling, hoping to set aside the French time limit15. They chose a dispute in which a con-
sumer credit contract manifestly lacked legibility: on the front of the offer the words 
‘Free application for money reserve’ were written in large letters but the references to a 
contractual interest rate of 17,92% and to a penalty clause were printed in small letters 
on the reverse. The limitation period of two years was expired but, instead of applying 
Article L. 311-37 of the French consumer code, Étienne and Juliette referred a question 
for preliminary ruling asking to the European Court of Justice whether such a time limi-
tation was compatible or not with the protection conferred on consumers by the Di-
rective. The European Court of Justice ruled that the French limitation period was con-
trary to the Directive.16 
Étienne and Juliette won their battle against the French Consumer code that was 
later amended. A new Article L.141-4, created by the law n°2008-3 of 3 January 2008, 
granted to the judge the power to assess unfair terms on his own motion and article 
L.311-37 on limitation period was been modified: 
 C’est moins spectaculaire que, disons, l’abolition de la peine de mort. C’est assez 
pour se dire qu’on a servi à quelque chose, et même qu’on a été de grands juges.17 
 
                                                 
13 Ivi, p. 304. 
14 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v and Salvat Editores SA. EU:C:2000:346, 
para 28.  
15 A passage of D’autres vies que la mienne perfectly shows the way in which small disputes are the the star-
ting point of fundamental evolutions in European case law: « Depuis quelques mois s’empilent sur son bureau des 
dossiers relatifs à un contrat proposé par notre vieille connaissance la Cofidis et joliment appelé Libravou. Ce contrat Li-
bravou pourrait être étudié à l’école comme exemple de flirt poussé avec l’arnaque. C’est présenté comme une « demande 
gratuite de réserve d’argent » avec le mot « gratuite » imprimé en très gros, le taux d’intérêt figure, lui, en tout petits caractères 
au verso et il est de 17,92% ce qui avec les pénalités est supérieur au taux d’usure. Dans la pile, Étienne choisit au hasard 
le dossier où encapsuler sa petite bombe : Cofidis SA contre Jean-Louis Fredout. Ce n’est pas une grosse affaire : Cofidis 
réclame 16310 F, dont 11398 de capital, le reste en intérêts et pénalités. » E. Carrère, op. cit., p. 235. 
16 ‘[…] the protection conferred on consumers by the Directive precludes a national provision which, in 
proceedings brought by a seller or supplier against a consumer on the basis of a contract concluded be-
tween them, prohibits the national court, on expiry of a limitation period, from finding, of its own motion 
or following a plea raised by the consumer, that a term of the contract is unfair.’ Case C-473/00, Cofidis 
SA v Jean-Louis Fredout EU:C:2002:705, para 38. 
17 E. Carrère, op. cit., p. 243. 
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III. The Individual Lives in Consumer Law: the double perspective 
of law and literature 
Carrère’s novel retraces the legal dialogue between the Tribunal d’instance of Vienne and 
the CJEU in succinct but clear terms. Nevertheless, as it has been argued in the intro-
duction, literature offers additional point of views and judgments of values on each of 
the individuals that are part of this story: consumers, moneylenders and judges. Private 
law, consumer law and literature describe and conceive these social categories in differ-
ent ways. Interestingly, these different perspectives are embodied by individuals belong-
ing to the same social categories that are described. For instance, the way in which con-
sumers’ behaviour is considered by moneylenders significantly differs from the one of 
judges, in particular the two protagonists of Carrère’s novel. It is therefore possible to 
argue that the rationalist and self-interested perspective is embodied by moneylenders 
while judges are the spokesmen of consumer law. This section will investigate these dif-
ferent representations making use of some excerpts from Carrère’s novel. It will firstly 
focus on consumers, then on moneylenders and finally and most importantly on judges. 
 
The image of consumer expressed by EU law consists in the benchmark of the 
‘average consumer’ whose rationality is not determined on the basis of statistic elements 
but through an ‘average consumer test’18. By contrast, in D’autres vie que la mienne the 
consumer is described from a double point of view. The first one corresponds to the 
traditional private law perspective according to which the will of parties is free and au-
tonomous. Therefore, consumers’ assistance should be reduced to the minimum be-
cause individuals are seen as rational agents that deliberately decide to bind themselves 
with the contract. The second perspective, inspiring the very idea of consumer law, 
takes into account the concrete informational asymmetry between consumers and mon-
eylenders. The novel shows this dichotomy in the descriptions of consumer, money-
lenders and judges but also in the representation of consumer law itself. 
In Carrère’s novel, the first perspective is embodied, for instance, by a law profes-
sor hostile to the very idea of consumer law:  
la seule fois où un de ses professeurs, à l’ENM, avait parlé de droit de la consom-
mation, c’était avec un dédain ironique, comme d’un droit à destination des imbé-
ciles, des gens qui signent des contrats sans les lire et qu’il est démagogique de vou-
loir assister19 
The image of the consumer drawn by Étienne’s professor at the school for judges is a 
mix of two negative judgments concerning both consumers, seen as naïve persons get-
ting into debts without worrying about the consequences, and consumer law itself as a 
demagogical discipline. 
The second perspective is conveyed by Étienne, Juliette and the author: it is the 
point of view of Carrères’s novel and of literature in general, often focusing on the so-
cial reality in which individuals live. Following this approach, inequality is an indisputa-
ble feature of social reality. Consequently, the reason why consumers are sometimes 
reckless is that they have no choice but to borrow. Two figures of the credit consumers 
                                                 
18 Cf. P. Cartwright, ‘The consumer image within EU law’, in C. Twigg-Fesner, op. cit., pp. 199-220. 
19 E. Carrère, op. cit., p. 162. 
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are outlined depending on whether their need to borrow is dictated by the pressures of 
consumerism (surendetté actif20) or by urgent necessity (surendetté passif21): 
[…] de toute manière on signe parce que c’est le seul moyen quand on a besoin, ou 
d’ailleurs pas toujours besoin mais envie, simplement envie, car même quand on 
est pauvre on a des envies, c’est ça le drame. 22 
Literature also reveals the double nature of credit establishments whose image, just like 
consumers’ one, can be regarded from two different perspective.  
On one hand, moneylenders are rational agents whose task is to offer a loan to 
people who would not have any chance to obtain one from a bank. Their job does not 
consist in teaching to consumers a prudent use of credit. 
[…] nos clients, ce qu’ils veulent, c’est de l’argent, pas des informations qui les dis-
suadent d’en emprunter. Et ce qu’on veut, nous, c’est gagner de l’argent en prêtant, 
pas recueillir des informations qui nous dissuadent de prêter. Nous ne faisons que 
notre métier, le crédit est une chose qui existe, et ce que vous [les juges] faites, 
vous, avec votre perpétuel pinaillage sur la forme des contrats, c’est simplement le 
procès de la publicité.23 
On the other hand, from Étienne’s point of view, moneylenders are seen as stronger 
parties abusing of credit consumers’ state of need to impose them unfair and illegal loan 
conditions: 
Dites-moi plutôt pourquoi, la connaissant, vous n’appliquez jamais cette règle qui 
est après tout facile à appliquer. J’ai une idée, moi, de la réponse : c’est simplement 
parce que ça vous arrange que les contrats ne soient pas lisibles. 24 
The duality of representation for each of the actors of consumer credit disputes also ap-
plies to the image of judge, the character on which Carrère’s novel focuses the most. 
What does being a ‘grand juge’ mean? As for all previous characters, literature unveils the 
ambiguity of individuals, it shows the possible conceptions of judge’s role and, in doing 
so, endorses one of them. 
                                                 
20 The author takes the dramatic example of the failed collective suicide of a French family enormously 
indebted: «[…] les Cartier usaient du crédit avec insouciance, et pour vivre au-dessus de leurs moyens. Ils 
achetaient une télévision et une console de jeux pour chaque enfant, de l’électroménager haut de gamme, 
ils remplaçaient compulsivement leur voiture, leurs meubles, leur équipement, s’abonnaient à tout et 
n’importe quoi, bref ils avaient le profil des gens à qui le moins dégourdi des vendeurs sait en poussant la 
porte de leur pavillon qu’il pourra fourguer ce qu’il voudra.» Ivi, p. 166. 
Such a description could seem closer to the first perspective according to which the impulsive consumer 
should not deserve the protection of law. Nevertheless, the fact that credit establishment takes advantage 
of consumer’s compulsive need to spend without warning him about the risks that he is taking makes it 
possible to consider that the surendetté actif, despite his recklessness, deserves protection. In fact: «combien 
il est facile de persuader les pauvres que, même pauvres, ils peuvent s’acheter une machine à laver, une 
voiture, une console Nintendo pour les enfants ou simplement de quoi manger, qu’il rembourseront plus 
tard et que ça ne leur coûtera autant dire rien de plus que s’ils réglaient comptant.» Ivi, p. 163. 
21 «À celui-ci, on ne peut pas faire grief de consommer avec excès […] parce qu’il est pauvre, très pauvre 
et qu’il n’a d’autre choix qu’emprunter pour remplir son caddie de paquets de nouilles.» Ibid. 
22 Ivi, p. 164. 
23 Ivi, p. 187. 
24 Ivi, p. 186. 
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On one hand, the respect of the principle of impartiality provides an image of the 
judge as guardian of the contract. On the other hand, particularly in consumer law, the 
judge is seen as the protector of the weaker party. The issue of the problematic coexist-
ence of these two missions appears several times in Carrère’s novel and is embodied in 
particular by Juliette’s character:  
Juliette n’aurait pas aimé, disait-il, qu’on dise qu’elle était du côté des démunis : ce 
serait trop simple, trop romantique, surtout ce ne serait pas juridique et elle restait 
obstinément juriste. Elle aurait dit qu’elle était du côté du droit […]25 
III. Literature and Partisanship: overcoming the conflict between 
positive law and Justice 
The fact that the question of judge’s role is ever-present in D’autres vies que la mienne is 
not surprising. In fact, the contrast between the impersonality of law and the emotional 
dimension implied in many legal disputes is one of the main objects of interest of ‘law in 
literature’ studies. The conflict illustrated by Carrère’s novel is nothing but a transposi-
tion in the consumer law field of the central conflict studied by philosophy of law and 
‘law and literature’ studies: the one between man-made law and Justice. Such a conflict 
was firstly put on stage by Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone, probably the piece of literature 
that has been studied the most by law and literature scholars.26 In D’autres vie que la 
mienne, Étienne and Juliette are facing a different type of conflict from Antigone’s one: 
nevertheless, an analogy between the two can be useful to strengthen the argument of 
this essay. In fact, the two judges from Vienne challenged national case law of the Cour 
de cassation in order to defend what they considered to be just: a more effective protec-
tion of consumers. In other words, the classical conflict between positive law and justice 
is reconfigured in Carrère’s novel and in consumer law in the one between the literal 
meaning of contract on one side and the need to protect the weaker party on the oth-
er.27 The terms of this conflict can be found in several passages where the two protago-
nists, together with the author, explicitly endorse a vision of society where autonomy of 
will is nothing but a chimera for the weaker party and according to which the very pur-
pose of law is to stem informational asymmetry.28 This representation of reality is also 
                                                 
25 Ivi, p. 104. Another example: «Et que fait-il, le juge d’instance ? En principe, il n’a pas beaucoup de 
marge. Il voit bien qu’il y a d’un côté un pauvre type étranglé, de l’autre une grosse boîte qui ne fait pas de 
sentiment, mais ce n’est pas la vocation de la grosse boîte de faire du sentiment et ce n’est pas celle du 
juge non plus.» Ivi, p. 166. 
26 ‘The central and most apparent conflict in Antigone is a conflict of laws, a mutually destructive collision 
between positive, man-made law and the eternal laws of the gods.’ M. S. Howenstein, ‘The tragedy of law 
and the law of tragedy in Sophocles’ Antigone’, Legal Studies Forum, 2000 (Vol. 24), p. 496. 
27 «Étienne n’avait pas eu besoin de huit ans dans le Pas-de-Calais pour apprendre que les hommes ne 
sont ni libres ni égaux, il n’en restait pas moins attaché, sans quoi il n’aurait pas été juriste, à l’idée que les 
contrats doivent être respectés.» E. Carrère, op. cit., p. 162. 
28 In order to express such a vision of law as a remedy to social inequalities, Carrère quotes Oswald Bau-
dot, the French judge who founded in 1968 the Syndicat de la magistrature and inspired Étienne’s con-
ception of law: «Soyez partiaux. Pour maintenir la balance entre le fort et le faible, entre le riche et le 
pauvre qui ne pèsent pas le même poids, faites-la pencher plus fort d’un côté. Ayez un préjugé favorable 
pour la femme contre l’homme, pour le débiteur contre le créancier, pour l’ouvrier contre le patron, pour 
l’écrasé contre la compagnie d’assurances de l’écraseur, pour le voleur contre la police, pour le plaideur 
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conveyed by descriptions of consumers as descriptions are the way through which litera-
ture implicitly states value judgements. Carrère’s portraits of consumers convey the idea 
that they deserve the protection that Étienne and Juliette try to grant them when the 
contract does not.29  
Is it possible to conclude that, unlike the serious but impartial poem of law30, lit-
erature is the expression of a partisan vision of social reality? A general answer to such a 
question cannot be given because each literary work provides a unique representation of 
reality in which a plurality of point of views can be present or not. 
Nevertheless, in the particular case of this novel, it can be argued that the answer 
should be negative for a precise reason. In D’autres vies que la mienne the conflict differs 
from the classic one described in most of ‘law in literature’ examples and in particular in 
Antigone. Very often novels oppose the rigid point of view of law to the humanistic sen-
sibility of literature. Such a topos does not fit this case as the conflict put on stage by the 
novel is the one between two different sources of law. Consequently, its solution is nec-
essarily internal to the legal system and can therefore be qualified as endogenous. In 
other words, unlike Antigone, Juliette and Étienne are not faced with the classical con-
flict between the rigidity of law and the feeling of Justice transcending it. Instead, they 
have to deal with a conflict of norms that can be solved by recourse to the hierarchical 
structure of legal system. Indeed, the question for preliminary ruling addressed to the 
Court of Justice is the way through which the hierarchy of norms is made effective. 
In such a perspective, the image of Justice coincides with the one of European 
consumer law by virtue of which the negative consequences of social inequalities are 
mitigated by depriving the contract of part of its strength.31 
Therefore, it can be argued that Carrère’s novel showed that overcoming the con-
flict between law and justice does not always require to go beyond the legal dimension 
venturing into the field of philosophy and literature. In some cases, as demonstrated by 
Étienne and Juliette, the best way to approach the real meaning of justice, whose purest 
version seems to belong to philosophy and art, consists in climbing Kelsen’s pyramid in 
the belief that: 
plus la norme de droit est élevée, plus elle est généreuse et proche des grands prin-
cipes qui inspirent le Droit avec un grand d.32 
                                                                                                                                          
contre la justice. La loi s’interprète, elle dira ce que vous voulez qu’elle dise. Entre le voleur et le volé, 
n’ayez pas peur de punir le volé.» Ivi, p. 183. 
29 An example of such a description: «Quarante-cinq ans, obèse, boudinée dans un jogging vert et mauve, 
les cheveux courts plaqués sur le front et de grosses lunettes fantaisie à motifs fluo, Mme A. n’en mène 
visiblement pas large. […] Mme A. gagne 950 euros par mois comme assistante hospitalière, elle a deux 
enfants de six et de quatre ans à sa charge, elle touche les allocations familiales et l’aide personnalisée au 
logement, mais comme elle travaille cette aide a baissé et ne couvre désormais qu’un tiers de son loyer. Sa 
situation est devenue critique quand elle a divorcé, trois ans plus tôt, car toutes les charges se sont multi-
pliées par deux.» Ivi, p. 171. 
30 «Il faut donc s’y résigner : droit et littérature vivent dans le regard l’un de l’autre. Parce qu’elle est libre, 
la littérature doit jouir d’une certaine immunité ; parce qu’il est responsable, l’interprétation du juriste se 
doit d’être rigoureuse car ses personnages ne son pas des êtres de fiction. Le droit est un poème sérieux.» 
A. Garapon, D. Salas, op. cit., p. 8. 
31 «[…] le droit est fait aussi pour les imbéciles, pour les ignorants, pour tous les gens qui certes ont signé 
un contrat mais qu’on a tout de même bien arnaqués.» E. Carrère, cit., p. 178. «La loi, cependant, tient 
compte de la réalité, et du fait que dans la réalité les parties ne sont pas aussi libres et égales que dans la 
théorie libérale. L’un possède, l’autre demande, l’un a le choix, l’autre moins […]». Ivi, p. 179. 
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that Étienne’s argument does not have a universal validity. In 
fact, in many cases, supranational law seems to contradict the feeling of justice of individuals to 
which literature is usually interested. For instance, European State-aid regulation is a fundamental 
instrument to preserve concurrence but also a source of negative externalities, such as closing 
down of factories and dismissals, that in the short run seem in conflict with the idea of social jus-
tice and that consequently are more likely to be perceived in a sympathetic way from the perspec-
tive of literature. This is why this essay argued that applying the hierarchy of norms can be the so-
lution to the conflict between law and justice only in some cases, such as the one described by 
Carrère. For all the others, the dramatic lesson of Antigone, constantly investigated by ‘law and 
literature’ studies, is still valid and the conflict between positive law and Justice is dramatically in-
tact. 
                                                                                                                                          
32 In order to make this argument as clear as possible, this passage deserves to be quoted in full: «Il est 
toujours jouissif, quand un petit chef vous brime en disant: c’est comme ça, pas autrement, je n’ai des 
comptes à rendre à personne, de découvrir qu’il y a au-dessus de lui un grand chef, et qu’en plus ce grand 
chef vous donne raison. Non seulement la CJCE dit le contraire de la Cour de cassation, mais elle a le pas 
sur elle, le droit communautaire ayant une valeur supérieure au droit national. Étienne ne connaissait rien 
au droit communautaire, mais le trouvait déjà formidable. Il commençait a développer la théorie qu’il 
nous a sortie, je m’en souviens, le matin de la mort de Juliette : plus la norme de droit est élevée, plus elle 
est généreuse et proche des grands principes qui inspirent le Droit avec un grand d. » Ivi, p. 233. 
